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Abstract
Nash equilibrium has long been a desired solution concept in multi-player games, especially
for those on continuous strategy spaces, which have attracted a rapidly growing amount of
interests due to advances in research applications such as the generative adversarial networks.
Despite the fact that several deep learning based approaches are designed to obtain pure strat-
egy Nash equilibrium, it is rather luxurious to assume the existence of such an equilibrium.
In this paper, we present a new method to approximate mixed strategy Nash equilibria in
multi-player continuous games, which always exist and include the pure ones as a special case.
We remedy the pure strategy weakness by adopting the pushforward measure technique to rep-
resent a mixed strategy in continuous spaces. That allows us to generalize the Gradient-based
Nikaido-Isoda (GNI) function to measure the distance between the players’ joint strategy pro-
file and a Nash equilibrium. Applying the gradient descent algorithm, our approach is shown
to converge to a stationary Nash equilibrium under the convexity assumption on payoff func-
tions, the same popular setting as in previous studies. In numerical experiments, our method
consistently and significantly outperforms recent works on approximating Nash equilibrium for
quadratic games, general blotto games, and GAMUT games.
1 Introduction
Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1950) is one of the most important solution concepts in game scenario
with multiple rational participants. It plays an important role in theoretical analysis of games to
guide rational decision-making processes in multi-agent systems. With the recent success of machine
learning applications in games, it attracts even more research interests on applying machine learning
technique for unsolved game theory problems, for example, computation of Nash equilibrium for
multi-player games. In this paper, we focus on games with continuous action spaces, which include
the famous application for Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) (Goodfellow et al., 2014),
as well as many important game types such as the colonel blotto game (Gross & Wagner, 1950),
Cournot competition (R, 1996). We develop a solution significantly improves the status-quo.
There have been several successful approaches to compute Nash equilibrium for multi-player
(mostly 2-player) continuous game (Raghunathan et al., 2019; Balduzzi et al., 2018). These works
seek Nash equilibria corresponding to pure strategies, in which each player takes a specific action to
achieve its best payoff given other players’ actions. A major concern for such a solution concept is
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its possible non-existence. As a result, the convergences to a Nash equilibrium for these approaches
were proven under the assumption for the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, which can
hardly be checked in practice, and their applicability is limited to specific types of games. On the
contrary, it is known that mixed strategy Nash equilibria always exist under mild conditions. And
note that any pure strategy Nash equilibrium is also a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, which
means the latter one is a much more desired solution concept.
However, a key challenge that obstructs the study of computing a mixed strategy Nash equilib-
rium, especially for a continuous game, lies on how to design an efficient method to represent the
mixed strategy. To be precise, a pure strategy can be represented by a single variable choosing from
some region. But as a distribution on each player’s action space, a mixed strategy with respect to
the player is defined in a (subspace of) real space R. More generally, exact representation for a
mixed strategy of a player usually requires many variables in a continuous space. In addition, the
corresponding probability distribution may not have a density function in closed-form.
To address this challenge, we introduce a pushforward measure technique. It is a common tool
in measure theory to transfer a measure to some specific measure space (Bogachev, 2007). Specific
to a continuous game, the probability distribution corresponding to a mixed strategy is obtained
via a mapping parameterized by neural nets from a multi-dimensional uniform distribution.
With this pushforward representation, we generalize the Gradient-based Nikaido-Isoda (GNI)
function, defined in (Raghunathan et al., 2019), to handle mixed strategy Nash equilibria. The orig-
inal GNI function can be viewed as a measure for the distance between any joint strategy profile and
a Nash equilibrium after applying the payoff functions of players. With proper generalization and
modification, we develop its mixed strategy version as a proper measure for a Nash equilibrium. We
prove that the distance becomes zero if and only if a stationary mixed Nash equilibrium is obtained.
Then we apply the gradient descent algorithm to the general GNI function, which converges to a
stationary mixed Nash equilibrium under the convexity assumptions on the payoff functions.
Finally, we compare our method with baseline algorithms in numerical experiments. Our ap-
proach shows effective convergence property in all the randomly generated quadratic games, general
blotto games and GAMUT games, which outperforms other baselines.
2 Background and Problem Description
The discrete action space Nash equilibrium computation has been most widely studied in the lit-
eratures. Most well-known being the LemkeHowson algorithm Lemke & Howson (1964) for solving
the bimatrix game. The state-of-art work in theoretical computer science of Tsaknakis and Spi-
rakis provided a solution of 1/3 approximation in polynomial time Tsaknakis & Spirakis (2007).
Surprisingly, an empirical work Fearnley et al. (2015) shows it performs well against practical game
solving methods for the bimatrix game.
However, continuous action space game computation is widely used in practice. But few meth-
ods are known for the general Nash equilibrium computation. Several recent effort to develop
computational method of Nash equilibrium for multi-player (mostly 2-player) continuous game
(Raghunathan et al., 2019; Balduzzi et al., 2018) have been restricted to pure strategies.
Game-theoretical approach has had useful applications to machine learning such as the opti-
mization of GAN network training (Daskalakis et al., 2017; Gidel et al., 2018) and adjustment on
the gradient descent method (Balduzzi et al., 2018). However they are limited to pure strategy
Nash equilibrium.
2
We are the first work to study the mixed strategy continuous game Nash equilibrium computa-
tion. Our work is motivated by the utilization of the Nikaido-Isoda (NI) function for loss function
minimization (Uryas’ ev & Rubinstein, 1994; Raghunathan et al., 2019). We start to establish a
theoretical formulation of the extend mixed strategy continuous action space Nash equilibrium as
a result of the minimization on a functional variation-based Nikaido-Isoda function.
2.1 Continuous Game Nash Equilibrium
Find x∗ = (x∗1, x
∗
2, · · · , x∗N )
s.t. x∗i = arg min
x∈Rn:x−i=x∗−i
fi(x) (1)
Here N denotes the number of players, and xi ∈ Rni the strategy of the i-th player where ni is the
dimension of his action space. Let n =
∑N
i=1 ni, and x = (x1, x2, · · · , xN ) ∈ Rn denotes the joint
pure strategy among all players while x−i = (x1, · · · , xi−1, xi+1, · · · , xN ) ∈ Rn−ni the joint pure
strategy among players except i. fi : Rn → R denotes the utility function (cost) of i-th player. A
solution x∗ to (1) is called a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
2.2 Nikaido-Isoda (NI) Function
In the paper (Nikaidoˆ et al. (1955)), Nikaido-Isoda (NI) function is introduced as:
φ(x) =
N∑
i=1
(
fi(x)− inf
xˆ∈Rn:xˆ−i=x−i
fi(xˆ)
)
,
N∑
i=1
φi(x) (2)
From the Equation (2), we know φ(x) > 0 for ∀x ∈ Rn, and φ(x) = 0 is the global minimum of NI
function which can only be achieved at a Nash equilibrium (NE). Therefore, a common algorithm
of computing NE points is minimizing the NI function above. However, it is a huge difficulty to
handle the global infimum. On the one hand, global infimum can not be obtained in finite time. On
the other hand, the infimum can be unbounded below in some games, for example the two-player
bi-linear games, where f1(x) = x
T
1Mx2 = −f2(x). All of the facts above show us the shortcomings
of NI function, and in order to rectify them, Raghunathan et al. (2019) introduces the following
Gradient-based Nikaido-Isoda (GNI) function.
2.3 Gradient-based Nikaido-Isoda (GNI) Function
If we calculate local infimum in the NI function φ(x) instead of global infimum, the time complexity
and unbounded infimum are no longer shortcomings. In precise, given the local radius λ, local
infimum can be approximated by steepest descent direction, and we get the following GNI function:
V (x;λ) =
N∑
i=1
(
fi(x)− fi(x1, · · · , xi−1, xi − λ∇ifi(x), xi+1, · · · , xN )
)
By minimizing V (x, λ), a stationary Nash point x∗, where ∇xifi(x∗) = 0 for ∀i, can be approxi-
mated efficiently. Furthermore, if all the utility functions fi are convex, then the stationary Nash
points (SNP) obtained are actually Nash Equilibrium (NE).
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3 (MC-GNI) Gradient-based Nikaido-Isoda Function of Mixed
Strategy on Continuous Games
In this section, we are going to introduce our novel Gradient-based Nikaido-Isoda function of mixed
strategy on continuous games (MC-GNI), which is used to get an approximated solution of the
following optimization problem.
Find pi∗ = (pi∗1 , pi
∗
2 , · · · , pi∗N )
s.t. pi∗i = arg min
pi:pi−i=pi∗−i
E
xj∼pij , ∀j
fi(x1, x2, · · · , xN ) (3)
Before we solve this optimization problem, there is another fundamental question, which is how we
should represent (or parametrize) a distribution pii. The simplest way to do so is to parametrize its
density function. However, not every distribution has its density function, such as Dirac distribu-
tion, and it will be inconvenient for us to do sampling from only a density function. Therefore, we
introduce another way, adopting the pushforward measure to represent a distribution.
Given a distribution µ0 and a mapping g(·), data x drown from µ0 can be transported into
a new distribution µ1 (constituted by g(x)). Technically speaking, µ1 is called the pushforward
measure of µ0 by mapping g, denoted by µ1 = g
#(µ0).
Here, for ∀j ∈ [N ], we prepare each distribution pij a corresponding pushforward function
gj : Rd → Rnj , and we have:
pij = g
#
j (U)
where U stands for the uniform distribution on [0, 1]d. Each time we want to sample from distribu-
tion pii, we only need to sample several ωi ∈ [0, 1]d from distribution U and calculate gi(ωi). Then,
these gi(ωi) form a sample set from distribution pii. And optimization problem (3) becomes:
Find g∗ = (g∗1 , g
∗
2 , · · · , g∗N )
s.t. g∗i = arg min
g:g−i=g∗−i
E
ωj∼U, ∀j
fi(g1(ω1), g2(ω2), · · · , gN (ωN )) (4)
To solve the optimization problem above, we consider the following Gradient-based Nikaido-Isoda
function of Mixed strategy on Continuous games (MC-GNI), generalized from the GNI function
introduced above, and we call this function V the local regret:
V (g1, g2, · · · , gN ;λ) =
N∑
i=1
Fi(g1, g2, · · · , gN )− Fi(g1, · · · , gi−1, gi − λδgiFi, · · · , gN )
,
N∑
i=1
Vi(g1, g2, · · · , gN ;λ)
(5)
Here, δgiFi stands for the 1-st order variation of functional Fi on element function gi and
Fi(g1, g2, · · · , gN ) = E
ωj∼U, ∀j
[fi(g1(ω1), g2(ω2), · · · , gN (ωN ))]
By minimizing the functional V (g1, g2, · · · , gN ;λ), we can approximately get stationary Nash points
(SNP), and even get Nash equilibrium if all the utility functions fi are convex. We will prove them
in the next section.
In practice, we further parametrize these pushforward functions as: gi(·) = gi(·, θi), to efficiently
calculate derivatives instead of variations. For simplicity, we denote gi as gθi . In order to obtain a
better expressibility, we use neural networks as the architecture to parametrize these pushforward
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functions. Then, MC-GNI function V can be transformed to:
V (gθ1 , gθ2 , · · · , gθN ;λ) =
N∑
i=1
Fi(gθ1 , gθ2 , · · · , gθN )− Fi(gθ1 , · · · , gθi−1 , gθi−λ∂θiFi , · · · , gθN )
Finally, the MC-GNI function can be minimized by implying gradient descent on these function
parameters θi, i ∈ [N ], the convergence of which is proved in the next section.
4 Theoretical Analysis of MC-GNI
4.1 The Sufficient and Necessary Condition of Stationary Nash Point
As a mixed strategy of an N -player continuous game, (pi1, pi2, · · · , piN ) = (g#1 U, g#2 U, · · · , g#NU) is
a stationary Nash point (SNP) if and only if for ∀i ∈ [N ], the 1-st order variation
δgi(Fi)[σ(x)] = 0 (6)
holds at each direction σ(x). Here:
Fi(g1, g2, · · · , gN ) = E
ωj∼U, ∀j
[fi(g1(ω1), g2(ω2), · · · , gN (ωN ))]
is the expectation of the i-th player’s utility with the form of N -variable functional. Now, we
compute the variation above and deduce the sufficient and necessary condition of SNP.
δgi(Fi)[σ(x)] = lim
→0
1

(Fi(g1, g2, · · · , gN )− Fi(g1, · · · , gi − σ, · · · , gN ))
= E
ωj∼U, ∀j
[σ(ωi)
T · ∇ifi(g1(ω1), g2(ω2), · · · , gN (ωN ))]
= E
ωi∼U
[σ(ωi)
T · E
ωj∼U, ∀j 6=i
[∇ifi(g1(ω1), g2(ω2), · · · , gN (ωN ))]]
, E
ωi∼U
[σ(ωi) ·G(ωi)] =
∫
[0,1]d
σ(ωi) ·G(ωi)dωi
(7)
where:
G(ωi) = E
ωj∼U, ∀j 6=i
[∇ifi(g1(ω1), g2(ω2), · · · , gN (ωN ))]
For SNP, Equation (6) holds at each direction σ(x), i.e. G(ωi) ≡ 0. Therefore, we have
Theorem 1. pi = (pi1, pi2, · · · , piN ) = (g#1 U, g#2 U, · · · , g#NU) is a stationary Nash point (SNP) for
an N -player continuous game if and only if:
E
ωj∼U, ∀j 6=i
[∇ifi(g1(ω1), g2(ω2), · · · , gN (ωN ))] ≡ 0, ∀ωi ∈ Rd
holds for all i ∈ [N ].
From Equation (7), we also know that:
δgi(Fi)[σ(ωi)] = 〈G(ωi), σ(ωi)〉
In other words, the steepest direction is:
δgi(Fi) = G(ωi) = E
ωj∼U, ∀j 6=i
[∇ifi(g1(ω1), g2(ω2), · · · , gN (ωN ))]
Then we show the relationship between stationary Nash point and Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 2. Denote SSNP ,SNE as the set of SNPs and NEs of a particular N -player continuous
game. Obviously, SNE ⊆ SSNP . If all utility functions fi are convex, we have: SNE = SSNP
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Proof. Suppose pi = (pi1, pi2, · · · , piN ) = (g#1 U, g#2 U, · · · , g#NU) is an SNP, we will prove it an NE
when all functions fi are convex. According to the convexity and the condition of SNPs, we know
that for ∀i ∈ [N ] and any other pushforward function g˜i:
Fi(g1, g2, · · · , gN )− Fi(g1, · · · , g˜i, · · · , gN )
= E
ωj∼U, ∀j
[fi(g1(ω1), · · · , g˜i(ωi), · · · , gN (ωN ))− fi(g1(ω1), g2(ω2), · · · , gN (ωN ))]
> E
ωj∼U, ∀j
[
(g˜i(ωi)− gi(ωi))T · ∇ifi(g1(ω1), g2(ω2), · · · , gN (ωN ))
]
= E
ωi∼U
[(g˜i(ωi)− gi(ωi))T · E
ωj∼U, ∀j 6=i
[∇ifi(g1(ω1), g2(ω2), · · · , gN (ωN ))]]
= E
ωi∼U
[(g˜i(ωi)− gi(ωi))T · δgi(Fi)] = 0
(8)
which leads to our conclusion, that pi = (g#1 U, g
#
2 U, · · · , g#NU) is a global Nash equilibrium.
Next, we show the relationship between the zeros of MC-GNI function V (g1, g2, · · · , gN ) and
SNPs of the N -player continuous game.
Lemma 1. Assume f : Rd → R is a twice differentiable function, and its 1-st order gradient ∇f
is Lf -Lipschitz continuous. Then for ∀x, y ∈ Rd, we have:
|f(y)− f(x)− 〈∇f(x), y − x〉| 6 1
2
Lf‖y − x‖22
Proof. According to the condition of f , there holds the following equations.
|f(y)− f(x)− 〈∇f(x), y − x〉| =
∣∣∣∣∫ 1
0
〈∇f(x+ τ(y − x))−∇f(x), y − x〉dτ
∣∣∣∣
6
∫ 1
0
|〈∇f(x+ τ(y − x))−∇f(x), y − x〉| dτ
6
∫ 1
0
‖∇f(x+ τ(y − x))−∇f(x)‖ · ‖y − x‖dτ
6
∫ 1
0
Lfτ‖y − x‖22dτ =
1
2
Lf‖y − x‖22
(9)
With this lemma, we can show that each global minimum of V (g1, g2, · · · , gN ) is also an SNP.
Theorem 3. If each utility function fi is twice differentiable and its 1-st order gradient ∇fi is
Lf -Lipschitz continuous. Then:
λ
2
‖δgiFi(g1, g2, · · · , gN )‖2 6 Vi(g1, g2, · · · , gN ;λ) 6
3λ
2
‖δgiFi(g1, g2, · · · , gN )‖2
holds when 0 < λ 6 1Lf . Here, ‖ · ‖2 is a functional norm which means:
‖f‖2 =
∫
[0,1]d
‖f(ωi)‖22 dωi = E
ωi∼U
‖f(ωi)‖22
Proof.
Vi(g1, g2, · · · , gN ;λ)
=Fi(g1, g2, · · · , gN )− Fi(g1, · · · , gi − λδgiFi, · · · , gN )
= E
ωj∼U, ∀j
[fi(g1(ω1), g2(ω2), · · · , gN (ωN ))− fi(g1(ω1), · · · , gi(ωi)− λδgiFi(ωi), · · · , gN (ωN ))]
(10)
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Then, according to Lemma 1:
Vi(g1, g2, · · · , gN ;λ)
6 E
ωj∼U, ∀j
[
λ(δgiFi(ωi))
T∇ifi(g1(ω1), g2(ω2), · · · , gN (ωN )) + Lf
2
λ2‖δgiFi(ωi)‖2
]
=λ E
ωi∼U
‖δgiFi(g1, g2, · · · , gN )(ωi)‖22 +
Lf
2
λ2 E
ωi∼U
‖δgiFi(g1, g2, · · · , gN )(ωi)‖22]
63λ
2
‖δgiFi(g1, g2, · · · , gN )‖2
(11)
And the other side of this inequality is similar.
The theorem above tells us that, V (g1, g2, · · · , gN ;λ) is always non-negative as long as λ 6 1Lf .
And its global minima, or in the other words, its zeros, are surely SNPs, because for ∀i ∈ [N ]:
Vi(g1, g2, · · · , gN ;λ) = 0 ⇔ δgiFi(g1, g2, · · · , gN ) = 0
Finally, we analyze the stability of SNPs. In the following theorem, we show that the 2-nd order
variation of functional V is a positive semidefinite operator, which confirms the stability of SNPs.
Theorem 4. The 2-nd order variation δ2V (g∗;λ) is a positive semidefinite operator for ∀g∗ ∈
SSNP and 0 6 λ 6 1Lf .
Proof. The 1-st and 2-nd order variation of Vi(g;λ) satisfy:
δVi(g;λ) = δFi(g)− δFi(g˜) + λ δ2Fi(g)DiδFi(g˜), (12)
where g = (g1, g2, · · · , gN ), g˜ = (g1, · · · , gi−1, gi − λδgiFi, · · · , gN ) and
Di = Diag(0n1×n1 , · · · , 0ni−1×ni−1 , Ini×ni , 0ni+1×ni+1 , · · · , 0nN×nN )
is a n× n matrix. Given g∗ ∈ SSNP , then δFi(g∗) = 0.
δ2Vi(g
∗;λ) = λ δ2Fi(g∗)[2Di − λDiδ2Fi(g∗)Di]δ2Fi(g∗)
 λ δ2Fi(g∗)[2Di − λLfD2i ]δ2Fi(g∗)
 λ δ2Fi(g∗)Diδ2Fi(g∗)
= λ (δ2Fi(g
∗)Di)T (δ2Fi(g∗)Di)
(13)
which is positive semidefinite. Therefore:
δ2V (g∗;λ) =
N∑
i=1
δ2Vi(g
∗;λ)
is also positive semidefinite.
4.2 Convergence Analysis
In this section, we analyze the convergence analysis of gradient descent:
g(k+1) = g(k) − ρ · δV (g(k);λ)
According to the definition of functional V (g;λ), it can be rewritten as the following form:
V (g;λ) = E
ωj∼U, ∀j∈[N ]
[GV (g1(ω1), g2(ω2), · · · , gN (ωN ))]
where GV =
∑N
i=1 fi(y1, y2, · · · , yN )− fi(y1, · · · , yi−1, yi − λ∇ifi(y1, y2, · · · , yN ), · · · , yN ).
Theorem 5. Suppose ∇GV (x) is LG-Lipschitz continuous.Through gradient descent, the function
sequence g(k) converges sublinearly to a stationary Nash point (SNP) g∗ if ρ < 1LG , λ 6
1
Lf
.
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Proof. According to Lemma 1, we have:
V (g(k+1);λ) 6 V (g(k);λ)− E
ωj∼U, ∀j∈[N ]
[
ρ ∇GV ((g1(ω1), g2(ω2), · · · , gN (ωN )) · δV (g(k);λ)
]
+ E
ωj∼U, ∀j∈[N ]
LG
2
ρ2‖δV (g(k);λ)‖2
= V (g(k);λ)− (ρ− LG
2
ρ2) ‖δV (g(k);λ)‖2
= V (g(k);λ)−
(
2ρLG − (ρLG)2
2LG
)
‖δV (g(k);λ)‖2
(14)
Let k = 0, 1, · · · ,K, and add them up, we have:
V (g(K+1);λ) 6 V (g(0);λ)−
(
2ρLG − (ρLG)2
2LG
) K∑
k=0
‖δV (g(k);λ)‖2
Since λ 6 1Lf , we know that V (g
(K+1);λ) > 0 by Theorem 3, we have
K∑
k=0
‖δV (g(k);λ)‖2 6
(
2LG
2ρLG − (ρLG)2
)
V (g(0);λ)
⇒ min
k∈[K]
‖δV (g(k);λ)‖2 6
(
2LG
2ρLG − (ρLG)2
)
V (g(0);λ)
K + 1
(15)
which completes our proof.
5 Experiments
To evaluate the practical performance of our approach, we apply it to three types of games, two-
player quadratic games, general blotto games, and GAMUT games, the most popular games for
evaluation of Nash equilibrium algorithms. In all the experiments, we set the local radius λ = 1e−3
and we use gradient descent as our optimization method with step size ρ = 1e− 2 and momentum
κ = 0.9. The network architecture we use for the pushforward functions gθ is a 6-layer fully
connected neural network with the size of each layer as: 20, 40, 160, 160, 40, 20. The size of
its output layer is the dimension of each player’s action space. From forward to backward, the
activation function we use is: tanh, tanh, tanh, ReLU, tanh, tanh.
We mainly compare our approach with two recent studies, gradient descent for GNI function
(Raghunathan et al., 2019) (gradGNI in short), and Symplectic Gradient Adjustment algorithm
(Balduzzi et al., 2018) (SGA in short), as they outperformed other existing algorithms applicable
to continuous game settings. For all these methods, we either follow the standard hyper-parameters
mentioned in the original papers, or the ones resulting in the best convergence.
5.1 Two-player Quadratic Game
The two-player quadratic game is defined by the the players’ payoff functions fi (i = 1, 2):
fi(x) = x
TQix+ r
T
i x, (16)
where Qi ∈ R(n1+n2)×(n1+n2), ri ∈ Rn1+n2 , x = (x1, x2) and xi ∈ Rni . In our experiments, we
choose n1 = n2 ∈ {3, 5, 10}. For each pair of ni, we randomly generate 100 instances for the
matrix Qi and ri for i = 1, 2. Each item in each matrix Qi and each vector ri follows the uniform
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distribution on [0, 1] independently.
We show the converging process of all algorithms for one game instance (n1 = n2 = 3) in
Fig. 1(a) as an example. As we can see, our approach effectively converges to a stationary Nash
equilibrium point. While the gradGNI approach also converges in this instance, its result has a
larger local regret. In other words, it obtains a worse approximation to Nash equilibrium, which
coincides with the essential difference between pure strategy and mixed strategy. The MC-GNI
approach searches for the equilibrium in the mixed strategy space, which includes the pure strategy
space that the gradGNI approaches searches in. On the other hand, the SGA approach diverges in
this game instance. We further take the average of the final local regret after 2000 iterations for
all the 100 instances, summarized in Tab. 1. All the algorithms show consistency as the dimension
of action space increases, and MC-GNI outperforms others regardless of the randomness of game
structures.
5.2 General Blotto Game
We next consider the general blotto game, which differs from previous games in the action space of
each player for which further constraints apply.
In a blotto game, player 1 and 2 (sometimes known as two colonels) have a budget of resource
X1, X2 respectively. W.l.o.g we set X1 ≤ X2. There are m battlefields in total. In each battlefield
j, when two players allocate x1j , x2j resource on it, the payoff of player i is:
Uij = f(xij − x−ij), where f(χ) = tanh (χ), (17)
where −i denotes the player other than player i. Each player’s payoff across all m battlefields is
the sum of the payoffs across the individual battlefields. For each player i, a feasible pure strategy
xi = (xi1, . . . , xim) ∈ Rm+ must also satisfies
∑m
j=1 xij ≤ Xi. Here we adopt the generalized blotto
game proposed by (Golman & Page, 2009) with continuous payoff functions. The payoff functions
in vanilla blotto game (Gross & Wagner, 1950) is discontinuous, for which our method as well as
baselines fails. In our experiments, we set m ∈ {3, 5, 10}. For each m, we randomly generate 100
instance for the budget Xi, following the uniform distribution on [0, 1] independently.
We show the converging process of all algorithms for one game instance (m = 3) in Fig. 1(b) as
an example. All the algorithms converges for this game, and both the gradGNI and SGA approaches
converges faster and more smoothly comparing with our MC-GNI. However, similar to the quadratic
game, their final results have larger local regret. This coincides with the fact that the mixed strategy
is a better solution concept than the pure strategy, especially in blotto games. We further take the
average of the final local regret after 2000 iterations for all the 100 instances, summarized in Tab.
1. All the algorithms show consistency as the dimension of action space increases, and MC-GNI
outperforms others regardless of the randomness of game structures.
5.3 GAMUT Games
Finally, we apply our method on the game instance generated by the comprehensive GAMUT
suite of game generators designated for testing game-theoretic algorithms Nudelman et al. (2004).
GAMUT includes a group of random distributions, based on each of which the payoff of each player
for each pure strategy profile can be drown independently. In precise, we extend the quadratic
game to a multi-player version, where ri = 0, and 100 game instances with 4 players are generated.
For each instance, one of the distributions from the GAMUT set is selected, and each item in each
matrix Qi is sampled according to it independently.
9
(a) ni = 3, 2-player quadratic (b) m = 3, 2-player blotto (c) ni = 3, 4-player gamut
Figure 1: Local Regret of Various Games.
MC-GNI (our model) gradGNI SGA
Quadratic (ni = 3) (1.63± 1.20)e-3 (1.01± 0.03)e-1 2.59± 0.17
Quadratic (ni = 5) (2.84± 1.95)e-3 (2.95± 0.19)e-1 3.92± 0.22
Quadratic (ni = 10) (3.76± 3.02)e-3 (1.47± 0.08)e-1 2.54± 0.09
Blotto (m = 3) (6.32± 4.97)e-6 (2.62± 0.38)e-5 (5.26± 0.91)e-5
Blotto (m = 5) (4.52± 3.09)e-6 (1.10± 0.06)e-5 (1.21± 0.18)e-5
Blotto (m = 10) (3.62± 2.39)e-6 (7.60± 0.49)e-6 (5.94± 0.26)e-6
GAMUT (ni = 3) (4.95± 0.42)e-3 (4.80± 0.81)e-1 (0.94± 0.13)e-1
GAMUT (ni = 5) (8.90± 0.79)e-3 (1.52± 0.27)e-1 (2.59± 0.60)e-1
GAMUT (ni = 10) (1.54± 0.86)e-2 (1.84± 0.48)e-1 (1.76± 0.32)e-1
Table 1: Comparison results.
We show the converging process of all algorithms for one game instance in Fig. 1(c). Both MC-
GNI and SGA converge, but SGA has a much worse final result than our MC-GNI. And this time,
gradGNI diverges. Furthermore, we take the average of the final local regert after 2000 iterations
for all the 100 instances, shown in Table 1.
From these different games, we know that our MC-GNI converges and performs better than
two baselines in all of the three games, which shows the effectiveness and efficiency of our MC-
GNI model. As the first algorithm to compute the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of games
with continuous action space, we believe that the technique we introduced here will enable new
optimization researches of many exciting interaction domains of algorithmic game theory and deep
learning.
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